WHY…? We do not learn from history…? because our studies are brief and prejudiced?

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THE FATE OF EMPIRES and SEARCH FOR SURVIVAL Sir John Glubb

(The following is the closing summary of Glubb’s fine work.)

As numerous points of interest have arisen in the course of this essay, I close with a brief summary, to refresh the reader’s mind.

(a) We do not learn from history because our studies are brief and prejudiced.

(b) In a surprising manner, 250 years emerges as the average length of national greatness.

(c) This average has not varied for 3,000 years. Does it represent ten generations?

(d) The stages of the rise and fall of great nations seem to be: The Age of Pioneers (outburst), The Age of Conquests, The Age of Commerce, The Age of Affluence, The Age of Intellect, The Age of Decadence.

(e) Decadence is marked by: Defensiveness, Pessimism, Materialism, Frivolity, An influx of foreigners, The Welfare State, A weakening of religion.

(f) Decadence is due to: Too long a period of wealth and power, Selfishness, Love of money, The loss of a sense of duty.

(g) The life histories of great states are amazingly similar, and are due to internal factors.

(h) Their falls are diverse, because they are largely the result of external causes.

(i) History should be taught as the history of the human race, though of course with emphasis on the history of the student’s own country.

The entire essay may be read at http://people.uncw.edu/kozloffm/glubb.pdf.

THE FATE OF EMPIRES
and
SEARCH FOR SURVIVAL
Sir John Glubb
John Bagot Glubb was born in 1897, his father being a regular officer in the Royal Engineers.
At the age of four he left England for Mauritius, where his father was posted for a three-year
tour of duty. At the age of ten he was sent to school for a year in Switzerland. These youthful
travels may have opened his mind to the outside world at an early age.
He entered the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich in September 1914, and was
commissioned in the Royal Engineers in April 1915. He served throughout the first World War
in France and Belgium, being wounded three times and awarded the Military Cross. In 1920 he
volunteered for service in Iraq, as a regular officer, but in 1926 resigned his commission and
accepted an administrative post under the Iraq Government.
In 1930, however, he signed a contract to serve the Transjordan Government (now Jordan).
From 1939 to 1956 he commanded the famous Jordan Arab Legion, which was in reality the
Jordan Army. Since his retirement he has published seventeen books, chiefly on the Middle
East, and has lectured widely in Britain, the United States and Europe.
William Blackwood & Sons Ltd
32 Thistle Street
Edinburgh EH1 1HA
Scotland
© J. B. G. Ltd, 1976, 1977
ISBN 0 85158 127 7
Printed at the Press of the Publisher
Introduction
As we pass through life, we learn by
experience. We look back on our behaviour
when we were young and think how foolish
we were. In the same way our family, our
community and our town endeavour to avoid
the mistakes made by our predecessors.
The experiences of the human race have
been recorded, in more or less detail, for
some four thousand years. If we attempt to
study such a period of time in as many
countries as possible, we seem to discover
the same patterns constantly repeated under
widely differing conditions of climate,
culture and religion. Surely, we ask
ourselves, if we studied calmly and
impartially the history of human institutions
and development over these four thousand
years, should we not reach conclusions
which would assist to solve our problems
limited to this small island. We endlessly
mull over the Tudors and the Stewarts, the
Battle of Crecy, and Guy Fawkes. Perhaps
this narrowness is due to our examination
system, which necessitates the careful
definition of a syllabus which all children
must observe.
I remember once visiting a school for
mentally
handicapped
children.
“Our
children do not have to take examinations,”
the headmaster told me,” and so we are able
to teach them things which will be really
useful to them in life.”
today? For everything that is occurring
around us has happened again and again
before.
No such conception ever appears to have
entered into the minds of our historians. In
general, historical teaching in schools is
However this may be, the thesis which I
wish to propound is that priceless lessons
could be learned if the history of the past
four thousand years could be thoroughly and
impartially studied. In these two articles,
which first appeared in Blackwood’s
Magazine, I have attempted briefly to sketch
some of the kinds of lessons which I believe
we could learn. My plea is that history
should be the history of the human race, not
of one small country or period.
The Fate of Empires
I
Learning from history
‘The only thing we learn from history,’ it
has been said, ‘is that men never learn from
history’, a sweeping generalisation perhaps,
but one which the chaos in the world today
goes far to confirm. What then can be the
reason why, in a society which claims to
probe every problem, the bases of history are
still so completely unknown?
Several reasons for the futility of our
historical studies may be suggested.
First, our historical work is limited to short
periods—the history of our own country, or
that of some past age which, for some
reason, we hold in respect.
Second, even within these short periods,
the slant we give to our narrative is governed
by our own vanity rather than by objectivity.
If we are considering the history of our own
country, we write at length of the periods
when our ancestors were prosperous and
victorious, but we pass quickly over their
shortcomings or their defeats. Our people
are represented as patriotic heroes, their
enemies as grasping imperialists, or
subversive rebels. In other words, our
national histories are propaganda, not well
balanced investigations.
Third, in the sphere of world history, we
study certain short, usually unconnected,
periods, which fashion at certain epochs has
made popular. Greece 500 years before
Christ, and the Roman Republic and early
Roman Empire are cases in point. The
intervals between the ‘great periods’ are
neglected. Recently Greece and Rome have
become largely discredited, and history tends
to become increasingly the parochial history
of our own countries.
To derive any useful instruction from
history, it seems to me essential first of all to
grasp the principle that history, to be
meaningful, must be the history of the
human race. For history is a continuous
process, gradually developing, changing and
turning back, but in general moving forward
in a single mighty stream. Any useful lessons
to be derived must be learned by the study of
the whole flow of human development, not
by the selection of short periods here and
there in one country or another.
Every age and culture is derived from its
predecessors, adds some contribution of its
own, and passes it on to its successors. If we
boycott various periods of history, the
origins of the new cultures which succeeded
them cannot be explained.

Sir John Glubb, better known as Glubb
Pasha, was born in 1897, and served in
France in the First World War from 1915 to

1918. In 1926 he left the regular army to
      serve the Iraq Government. From 1939 to
      1956, he commanded the famous Jordan
      Arab Legion. Since retirement, he has
      published sixteen books, chiefly on the
      Middle East, and has lectured widely.
      2
      The Fate of Empires
      Physical science has expanded its knowledge
      by building on the work of its predecessors,
      and by making millions of careful experi
      ments, the results of which are meticulously
      recorded. Such methods have not yet been
      employed in the study of world history. Our
      piecemeal historical work is still mainly
      dominated by emotion and prejudice.
      II The lives of empires
      If we desire to ascertain the laws which
      govern the rise and fall of empires, the
      obvious course is to investigate the imperial
      experiments recorded in history, and to
      The nation
      endeavour to deduce from them any lessons
      which seem to be applicable to them all.
      The word ‘empire’, by association with the
      British Empire, is visualised by some people
      as an organisation consisting of a home
      country in Europe and ‘colonies’ in other
      continents. In this essay, the term ‘empire’ is
      used to signify a great power, often called
      today a superpower. Most of the empires in
      history have been large landblocks, almost
      without overseas possessions.
      We possess a considerable amount of
      information on many empires recorded in
      history, and of their vicissitudes and the
      lengths of their lives, for example:
      Dates of rise and fall
      Assyria
      Persia
      (Cyrus and his descendants)
      Greece
      (Alexander and his successors)
      Roman Republic
      Roman Empire
      Arab Empire
      Mameluke Empire
      Ottoman Empire
      Spain
      Romanov Russia
      Britain
      859-612 B.C.
      538-330 B.C.
      331-100 B.C.
      260-27 B.C.
      27 B.C.-A.D. 180
      A.D. 634-880
      1250-1517
      1320-1570
      1500-1750
      1682-1916
      Duration in years
      247
      208
      231
      233
      207
      246
      267
      250
      250
      234
      1700-1950
      This list calls for certain comments.
      (1) The present writer is exploring the facts,
      not trying to prove anything. The dates given
      are largely arbitrary. Empires do not usually
      begin or end on a certain date. There is
      250
      normally a gradual period of expansion and
      then a period of decline. The resemblance in
      the duration of these great powers may be
      queried. Human affairs are subject to many
      chances, and it is not to be expected that they
      The Fate of Empires
      3
      could be calculated with mathematical
      accuracy.
      (2) Nevertheless, it is suggested that there is
      sufficient resemblance between the life
      periods of these different empires to justify
      further study.
      (3) The division of Rome into two periods
      may be thought unwarranted. The first, or
      republican, period dates from the time when
      Rome became the mistress of Italy, and ends
      with the accession of Augustus. The imperial
      period extends from the accession of
      Augustus to the death of Marcus Aurelius. It
      is true that the empire survived nominally
      for more than a century after this date, but it
      did so in constant confusion, rebellions, civil
      wars and barbarian invasions.
      (4) Not all empires endured for their full life
      span. The Babylonian Empire of Nebucha
      dnezzar, for example, was overthrown by
      Cyrus, after a life duration of only some
      seventy-four years.
      (5) An interesting deduction from the figures
      seems to be that the duration of empires
      does not depend on the speed of travel or the
      nature of weapons. The Assyrians marched
      on foot and fought with spears and bow and
      arrows. The British used artillery, railways
      and ocean-going ships. Yet the two empires
      lasted for approximately the same periods.
      There is a tendency nowadays to say that
      this is the jet-age, and consequently there is
      nothing for us to learn from past empires.
      Such an attitude seems to be erroneous.
      (6) It is tempting to compare the lives of
      empires with those of human beings. We
      may choose a figure and say that the average
      life of a human being is seventy years. Not all
      human beings live exactly seventy years.
      Some die in infancy, others are killed in
      accidents in middle life, some survive to the
      age of eighty or ninety. Nevertheless, in spite
      of such exceptions, we are justified in saying
      that seventy years is a fair estimate of the
      average person’s expectation of life.
      (7) We may perhaps at this stage be allowed
      to draw certain conclusions:
      (a) In spite of the accidents of fortune, and
      the apparent circumstances of the human
      race at different epochs, the periods of
      duration of different empires at varied
      epochs show a remarkable similarity.
      (b) Immense changes in the technology of
      transport or in methods of warfare do not
      seem to affect the life-expectation of an
      empire.
      (c) The changes in the technology of trans
      port and of war have, however, affected the
      shape of empires. The Assyrians, marching
      on foot, could only conquer their neigh
      bours, who were accessible by land—the
      Medes, the Babylonians, the Persians and
      the Egyptians.
      The British, making use of ocean-going
      ships, conquered many countries and sub
      continents, which were accessible to them
      by water—North America, India, South
      Africa, Australia and New Zealand—but
      they never succeeded in conquering their
      neighbours, France, Germany and Spain.
      But, although the shapes of the Assyrian
      and the British Empires were entirely
      different, both lasted about the same
      length of time.
      III The human yardstick
      What then, we may ask, can have been the
      factor which caused such an extraordinary
      similarity in the duration of empires, under
      such diverse conditions, and such utterly
      different technological achievements?
      4
      The Fate of Empires
      One of the very few units of measurement
      which have not seriously changed since the
      Assyrians is the human ‘generation’, a period
      of about twenty-five years. Thus a period of
      250 years would represent about ten gene
      rations of people. A closer examination of the
      characteristics of the rise and fall of great
      nations may emphasise the possible signifi
      cance of the sequence of generations.
      Let us then attempt to examine the stages
      in the lives of such powerful nations.
      IV Stage one. The outburst
      Again and again in history we find a small
      nation, treated as insignificant by its
      contemporaries, suddenly emerging from its
      homeland and overrunning large areas of the
      world. Prior to Philip (359-336 B.C.), Mace
      don had been an insignificant state to the
      north of Greece. Persia was the great power
      of the time, completely dominating the area
      from Eastern Europe to India. Yet by 323
      B.C., thirty-six years after the accession of
      Philip, the Persian Empire had ceased to
      exist, and the Macedonian Empire extended
      from the Danube to India, including Egypt.
      This amazing expansion may perhaps he
      attributed to the genius of Alexander the
      Great, but this cannot have been the sole
      reason; for although after his death every
      thing went wrong—the Macedonian generals
      fought one another and established rival
      empires—Macedonian pre-eminence survi
      ved for 231 years.
      In the year A.D. 600, the world was divided
      between two superpower groups as it has
      been for the past fifty years between Soviet
      Russia and the West. The two powers were
      the eastern Roman Empire and the Persian
      Empire. The Arabs were then the despised
      and backward inhabitants of the Arabian
      Peninsula. They consisted chiefly of wan
      dering tribes, and had no government, no
      constitution and no army. Syria, Palestine,
      Egypt and North Africa were Roman
      provinces, Iraq was part of Persia.
      The Prophet Mohammed preached in
      Arabia from A.D. 613 to 632, when he died.
      In 633, the Arabs burst out of their desert
      peninsula, and simultaneously attacked the
      two super-powers. Within twenty years, the
      Persian Empire had ceased to exist. Seventy
      years after the death of the Prophet, the
      Arabs had established an empire extending
      from the Atlantic to the plains of Northern
      India and the frontiers of China.
      At the beginning of the thirteenth century,
      the Mongols were a group of savage tribes in
      the steppes of Mongolia. In 1211, Genghis
      Khan invaded China. By 1253, the Mongols
      had established an empire extending from
      Asia Minor to the China Sea, one of the
      largest empires the world has ever known.
      The Arabs ruled the greater part of Spain
      for 780 years, from 712 A.D. to 1492. (780
      years back in British history would take us to
      1196 and King Richard Cœur de Lion.)
      During these eight centuries, there had been
      no Spanish nation, the petty kings of Aragon
      and Castile alone holding on in the
      mountains.
      The agreement between Ferdinand and
      Isabella and Christopher Columbus was
      signed immediately after the fall of Granada,
      the last Arab kingdom in Spain, in 1492.
      Within fifty years, Cortez had conquered
      Mexico, and Spain was the world’s greatest
      empire.
      Examples of the sudden outbursts by
      which empires are born could be multiplied
      indefinitely. These random illustrations must
      suffice.
      The Fate of Empires
      5
      V Characteristics of the outburst
      These sudden outbursts are usually
      characterised by an extraordinary display of
      energy and courage. The new conquerors are
      normally poor, hardy and enterprising and
      above all aggressive. The decaying empires
      which they overthrow are wealthy but
      defensive-minded. In the time of Roman
      greatness, the legions used to dig a ditch
      round their camps at night to avoid surprise.
      But the ditches were mere earthworks, and
      between them wide spaces were left through
      which the Romans could counter-attack. But
      as Rome grew older, the earthworks became
      high walls, through which access was given
      only by narrow gates. Counterattacks were
      no longer possible. The legions were now
      passive defenders.
      But the new nation is not only distingui
      shed by victory in battle, but by unresting
      enterprise in every field. Men hack their way
      through jungles, climb mountains, or brave
      the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans in tiny
      cockle-shells. The Arabs crossed the Straits
      of Gibraltar in A.D. 711 with 12,000 men,
      defeated a Gothic army of more than twice
      their strength, marched straight over 250
      miles of unknown enemy territory and seized
      the Gothic capital of Toledo. At the same
      stage in British history, Captain Cook disco
      vered Australia. Fearless initiative characte
      rises such periods.
      Other peculiarities of the period of the
      conquering pioneers are their readiness to
      improvise and experiment. Untrammelled by
      traditions, they will turn anything available
      to their purpose. If one method fails, they try
      something else. Uninhibited by textbooks or
      book learning, action is their solution to
      every problem.
      Poor, hardy, often half-starved and ill-clad,
      they abound in courage, energy and
      initiative, overcome every obstacle and
      always seem to be in control of the situation.
      VI The causes of race outbursts
      The modern instinct is to seek a reason for
      everything, and to doubt the veracity of a
      statement for which a reason cannot be
      found. So many examples can be given of the
      sudden eruption of an obscure race into a
      nation of conquerors that the truth of the
      phenomenon cannot be held to be doubtful.
      To assign a cause is more difficult. Perhaps
      the easiest explanation is to assume that the
      poor and obscure race is tempted by the
      wealth of the ancient civilisation, and there
      would undoubtedly appear to be an element
      of greed for loot in barbarian invasions.
      Such a motivation may be divided into two
      classes. The first is mere loot, plunder and
      rape, as, for example, in the case of Attila
      and the Huns, who ravaged a great part of
      Europe from A.D. 450 to 453. However, when
      Attila died in the latter year, his empire fell
      apart and his tribes returned to Eastern
      Europe.
      Many of the barbarians who founded
      dynasties in Western Europe on the ruins of
      the Roman Empire, however, did so out of
      admiration for Roman civilisation, and
      themselves aspired to become Romans.
      VII A providential turnover?
      Whatever causes may be given for the
      overthrow of great civilisations by
      barbarians, we can sense certain resulting
      benefits. Every race on earth has distinctive
      characteristics. Some have been distingui
      shed in philosophy, some in administration,
      some in romance, poetry or religion, some in
      6
      The Fate of Empires
      their legal system. During the pre-eminence
      of each culture, its distinctive characteristics
      are carried by it far and wide across the
      world.
      If the same nation were to retain its
      domination indefinitely, its peculiar qualities
      would permanently characterise the whole
      human race. Under the system of empires
      each lasting for 250 years, the sovereign race
      has time to spread its particular virtues far
      and wide. Then, however, another people,
      with entirely different peculiarities, takes its
      place, and its virtues and accomplishments
      are likewise disseminated. By this system,
      each of the innumerable races of the world
      enjoys a period of greatness, during which its
      peculiar qualities are placed at the service of
      mankind.
      To those who believe in the existence of
      God, as the Ruler and Director of human
      affairs, such a system may appear as a
      manifestation of divine wisdom, tending
      towards the slow and ultimate perfection of
      humanity.
      VIII The course of empire
      The first stage of the life of a great nation,
      therefore, after its outburst, is a period of
      amazing initiative, and almost incredible
      enterprise, courage and hardihood. These
      qualities, often in a very short time, produce
      a new and formidable nation. These early
      victories, however, are won chiefly by
      reckless bravery and daring initiative.
      The ancient civilisation thus attacked will
      have defended itself by its sophisticated
      weapons, and by its military organisation
      and discipline. The barbarians quickly
      appreciate the advantages of these military
      methods and adopt them. As a result, the
      second stage of expansion of the new empire
      consists of more organised, disciplined and
      professional campaigns.
      In other fields, the daring initiative of the
      original
      conquerors is maintained—in
      geographical exploration, for example:
      pioneering new countries, penetrating new
      forests, climbing unexplored mountains, and
      sailing uncharted seas. The new nation is
      confident, optimistic and perhaps contemp
      tuous of the ‘decadent’ races which it has
      subjugated.
      The methods employed tend to be practical
      and experimental, both in government and
      in warfare, for they are not tied by centuries
      of tradition, as happens in ancient empires.
      Moreover, the leaders are free to use their
      own improvisations, not having studied
      politics or tactics in schools or in textbooks.
      IX U.S.A. in the stage of the pioneers
      In the case of the United States of America,
      the pioneering period did not consist of a
      barbarian conquest of an effete civilisation,
      but of the conquest of barbarian peoples.
      Thus, viewed from the outside, every
      example seems to be different. But viewed
      from the standpoint of the great nation,
      every example seems to be similar.
      The United States arose suddenly as a new
      nation, and its period of pioneering was
      spent in the conquest of a vast continent, not
      an ancient empire. Yet the subsequent life
      history of the United States has followed the
      standard pattern which we shall attempt to
      trace—the periods of the pioneers, of
      commerce, of affluence, of intellectualism
      and of decadence.
      X Commercial expansion
      The conquest of vast areas of land and
      their
      subjection to one government
      The Fate of Empires
      7
      automatically acts as a stimulant to com
      merce. Both merchants and goods can be
      exchanged over considerable distances.
      Moreover, if the empire be an extensive one,
      it will include a great variety of climates,
      producing extremely varied products, which
      the different areas will wish to exchange with
      one another.
      The speed of modern methods of trans
      portation tends to create in us the impress
      sion that far-flung commerce is a modern
      development, but this is not the case. Objects
      made in Ireland, Scandinavia and China
      have been found in the graves or the ruins of
      the Middle East, dating from 1,000 years
      before Christ. The means of transport were
      slower, but, when a great empire was in
      control, commerce was freed from the
      innumerable shackles imposed upon it today
      by passports, import permits, customs,
      boycotts and political interference.
      The Roman Empire extended from Britain
      to Syria and Egypt, a distance, in a direct
      line, of perhaps 2,700 miles. A Roman
      official, transferred from Britain to Syria,
      might spend six months on the journey. Yet,
      throughout the whole distance, he would be
      travelling in the same country, with the same
      official language, the same laws, the same
      currency and the same administrative
      system. Today, some twenty independent
      countries separate Britain from Syria, each
      with its own government, its own laws,
      politics,
      customs fees, passports and
      currencies, making commercial co-operation
      almost impossible. And this process of
      disintegration is still continuing. Even within
      the small areas of the modern European
      nations, provincial movements demanding
      secession or devolution tend further to
      splinter the continent.
      The present fashion for ‘independence’ has
      produced great numbers of tiny states in the
      world, some of them consisting of only one
      city or of a small island. This system is an
      insuperable obstacle to trade and co
      operation. The present European Economic
      Community is an attempt to secure commer
      cial cooperation among small independent
      states over a large area, but the plan meets
      with many difficulties, due to the mutual
      jealousies of so many nations.
      Even savage and militaristic empires
      promoted commerce, whether or not they
      intended to do so. The Mongols were some of
      the most brutal military conquerors in
      history, massacring the entire populations of
      cities. Yet, in the thirteenth century, when
      their empire extended from Peking to
      Hungary, the caravan trade between China
      and Europe achieved a remarkable degree of
      prosperity—the whole journey was in the
      territory of one government.
      In the eighth and ninth centuries, the
      caliphs of Baghdad achieved fabulous wealth
      owing to the immense extent of their
      territories, which constituted a single trade
      bloc. The empire of the caliphs is now
      divided into some twenty-five separate
      ‘nations’.
      XI The pros and cons of empires
      In discussing the life-story of the typical
      empire, we have digressed into a discussion
      of whether empires are useful or injurious to
      mankind. We seem to have discovered that
      empires have certain advantages, particu
      larly in the field of commerce, and in the
      establishment of peace and security in vast
      areas of the globe. Perhaps we should also
      include the spread of varied cultures to many
      races. The present infatuation for indepen
      8
      The Fate of Empires
      dence for ever smaller and smaller units will
      eventually doubtless be succeeded by new
      international empires.
      The present attempts to create a European
      community may be regarded as a practical
      endeavour to constitute a new super-power,
      in spite of the fragmentation resulting from
      the craze for independence. If it succeeds,
      some of the local independencies will have to
      be sacrificed. If it fails, the same result may
      be attained by military conquest, or by the
      partition of Europe between rival super
      powers. The inescapable conclusion seems,
      however, to be that larger territorial units are
      a benefit to commerce and to public stability,
      whether the broader territory be achieved by
      voluntary association or by military action.
      XII Sea power
      One of the more benevolent ways in which
      a super-power can promote both peace and
      commerce is by its command of the sea.
      From Waterloo to 1914, the British Navy
      commanded the seas of the world. Britain
      grew rich, but she also made the Seas safe for
      the commerce of all nations, and prevented
      major wars for 100 years.
      Curiously enough, the question of sea
      power was never clearly distinguished, in
      British politics during the last fifty years,
      from the question of imperial rule over other
      countries. In fact, the two subjects are
      entirely distinct. Sea power does not offend
      small countries, as does military occupation.
      If Britain had maintained her navy, with a
      few naval bases overseas in isolated islands,
      and had given independence to colonies
      which asked for it, the world might well be a
      more stable place today. In fact, however, the
      navy was swept away in the popular outcry
      against imperialism.
      XIII The Age of Commerce
      Let us now, however, return to the life
      story of our typical empire. We have already
      considered the age of outburst, when a little
      regarded people suddenly bursts on to the
      world stage with a wild courage and energy.
      Let us call it the Age of the Pioneers.
      Then we saw that these new conquerors
      acquired the sophisticated weapons of the
      old empires, and adopted their regular
      systems of military organisation and
      training. A great period of military expansion
      ensued, which we may call the Age of
      Conquests. The conquests resulted in the
      acquisition of vast territories under one
      government, thereby automatically giving
      rise to commercial prosperity. We may call
      this the Age of Commerce.
      The Age of Conquests, of course, overlaps
      the Age of Commerce. The proud military
      traditions still hold sway and the great
      armies guard the frontiers, but gradually the
      desire to make money seems to gain hold of
      the public. During the military period, glory
      and honour were the principal objects of
      ambition. To the merchant, such ideas are
      but empty words, which add nothing to the
      bank balance.
      XIV Art and luxury
      The wealth which seems, almost without
      effort, to pour into the country enables the
      commercial classes to grow immensely rich.
      How to spend all this money becomes a
      problem to the wealthy business community.
      Art, architecture and luxury find rich
      patrons. Splendid municipal buildings and
      wide streets lend dignity and beauty to the
      wealthy areas of great cities. The rich
      merchants build themselves palaces, and
      money is invested in communications,
      The Fate of Empires
      9
      highways, bridges, railways or hotels,
      according to the varied patterns of the ages.
      The first half of the Age of Commerce
      appears to be peculiarly splendid. The
      ancient virtues of courage, patriotism and
      devotion to duty are still in evidence. The
      nation is proud, united and full of self
      confidence. Boys are still required, first of all,
      to be manly—to ride, to shoot straight and to
      tell the truth. (It is remarkable what
      emphasis is placed, at this stage, on the
      manly virtue of truthfulness, for lying is
      cowardice—the fear of facing up to the
      situation.)
      Boys’ schools are intentionally rough. Fru
      gal eating, hard living, breaking the ice to
      have a bath and similar customs are aimed at
      producing a strong, hardy and fearless breed
      of men. Duty is the word constantly drum
      med into the heads of young people.
      The Age of Commerce is also marked by
      great enterprise in the exploration for new
      forms of wealth. Daring initiative is shown in
      the search for profitable enterprises in far
      corners of the earth, perpetuating to some
      degree the adventurous courage of the Age of
      Conquests.
      XV The Age of Affluence
      There does not appear to be any doubt that
      money is the agent which causes the decline
      of this strong, brave and self-confident
      people. The decline in courage, enterprise
      and a sense of duty is, however, gradual.
      The first direction in which wealth injures
      the nation is a moral one. Money replaces
      honour and adventure as the objective of the
      best young men. Moreover, men do not
      normally seek to make money for their
      country or their community, but for them
      selves. Gradually, and almost imperceptibly,
      the Age of Affluence silences the voice of
      duty. The object of the young and the
      ambitious is no longer fame, honour or
      service, but cash.
      Education undergoes the same gradual
      transformation. No longer do schools aim at
      producing brave patriots ready to serve their
      country. Parents and students alike seek the
      educational
      qualifications
      which will
      command the highest salaries. The Arab
      moralist, Ghazali (1058-1111), complains in
      these very same words of the lowering of
      objectives in the declining Arab world of his
      time. Students, he says, no longer attend
      college to acquire learning and virtue, but to
      obtain those qualifications which will enable
      them to grow rich. The same situation is
      everywhere evident among us in the West
      today.
      XVI High Noon
      That which we may call the High Noon of
      the nation covers the period of transition
      from the Age of Conquests to the Age of
      Affluence: the age of Augustus in Rome, that
      of Harun al-Rashid in Baghdad, of Sulaiman
      the Magnificent in the Ottoman Empire, or
      of Queen Victoria in Britain. Perhaps we
      might add the age of Woodrow Wilson in the
      United States.
      All these periods reveal the same
      characteristics. The immense wealth accu
      mulated in the nation dazzles the onlookers.
      Enough of the ancient virtues of courage,
      energy and patriotism survive to enable the
      state successfully to defend its frontiers. But,
      beneath the surface, greed for money is
      gradually replacing duty and public service.
      Indeed the change might be summarised as
      being from service to selfishness.
      10
      The Fate of Empires
      XVII Defensiveness
      Another outward change which invariably
      marks the transition from the Age of
      Conquests to the Age of Affluence is the
      spread of defensiveness. The nation, immen
      sely rich, is no longer interested in glory or
      duty, but is only anxious to retain its wealth
      and its luxury. It is a period of defensiveness,
      from the Great Wall of China, to Hadrian’s
      Wall on the Scottish Border, to the Maginot
      Line in France in 1939.
      Money being in better supply than courage,
      subsidies instead of weapons are employed
      to buy off enemies. To justify this departure
      from ancient tradition, the human mind
      easily devises its own justification. Military
      readiness, or aggressiveness, is denounced as
      primitive and immoral. Civilised peoples are
      too proud to fight. The conquest of one
      nation by another is declared to be immoral.
      Empires are wicked. This intellectual device
      enables us to suppress our feeling of
      inferiority, when we read of the heroism of
      our ancestors, and then ruefully contemplate
      our position today. ‘It is not that we are
      afraid to fight,’ we say, ‘but we should
      consider it immoral.’ This even enables us to
      assume an attitude of moral superiority.
      The weakness of pacifism is that there are
      still many peoples in the world who are
      aggressive. Nations who proclaim themselves
      unwilling to fight are liable to be conquered
      by peoples in the stage of militarism—
      perhaps even to see themselves incorporated
      into some new empire, with the status of
      mere provinces or colonies.
      When to be prepared to use force and when
      to give way is a perpetual human problem,
      which can only be solved, as best we can, in
      each successive situation as it arises. In fact,
      however, history seems to indicate that great
      nations do not normally disarm from
      motives of conscience, but owing to the
      weakening of a sense of duty in the citizens,
      and the increase in selfishness and the desire
      for wealth and ease.
      XVIII The Age of Intellect
      We have now, perhaps arbitrarily, divided
      the life-story of our great nation into four
      ages. The Age of the Pioneers (or the
      Outburst), the Age of Conquests, the Age of
      Commerce, and the Age of Affluence. The
      great wealth of the nation is no longer
      needed to supply the mere necessities, or
      even the luxuries of life. Ample funds are
      available also for the pursuit of knowledge.
      The merchant princes of the Age of
      Commerce seek fame and praise, not only by
      endowing works of art or patronising music
      and literature. They also found and endow
      colleges and universities. It is remarkable
      with what regularity this phase follows on
      that of wealth, in empire after empire,
      divided by many centuries.
      In the eleventh century, the former Arab
      Empire, then in complete political decline,
      was ruled by the Seljuk sultan, Malik Shah.
      The Arabs, no longer soldiers, were still the
      intellectual leaders of the world. During the
      reign of Malik Shah, the building of
      universities and colleges became a passion.
      Whereas a small number of universities in
      the great cities had sufficed the years of Arab
      glory, now a university sprang up in every
      town.
      In our own lifetime, we have witnessed the
      same phenomenon in the U.S.A. and Britain.
      When these nations were at the height of
      their glory, Harvard, Yale, Oxford and
      Cambridge seemed to meet their needs. Now
      almost every city has its university.
      The Fate of Empires
      11
      The ambition of the young, once engaged
      in the pursuit of adventure and military
      glory, and then in the desire for the
      accumulation of wealth, now turns to the
      acquisition of academic honours.
      It is useful here to take note that almost all
      the pursuits followed with such passion
      throughout the ages were in themselves
      good. The manly cult of hardihood, frank
      ness and truthfulness, which characterised
      the Age of Conquests, produced many really
      splendid heroes.
      The opening up of natural resources, and
      the peaceful accumulation of wealth, which
      marked the age of commercialism, appeared
      to introduce new triumphs in civilisation, in
      culture and in the arts. In the same way, the
      vast expansion of the field of knowledge
      achieved by the Age of Intellect seemed to
      mark a new high-water mark of human
      progress. We cannot say that any of these
      changes were ‘good’ or ‘bad’.
      The striking features in the pageant of
      empire are:
      (a) the extraordinary exactitude with which
      these stages have followed one another, in
      empire after empire, over centuries or even
      millennia; and
      (b) the fact that the successive changes
      seem to represent mere changes in popular
      fashion—new fads and fancies which sweep
      away public opinion without logical reason.
      At first, popular enthusiasm is devoted to
      military glory, then to the accumulation of
      wealth and later to the acquisition of
      academic fame.
      Why could not all these legitimate, and
      indeed beneficent, activities be carried on
      simultaneously, each of them in due modera
      tion? Yet this never seemed to happen.
      XIX The effects of intellectualism
      There are so many things in human life
      which are not dreamt of in our popular
      philosophy. The spread of knowledge seems
      to be the most beneficial of human activities,
      and yet every period of decline is character
      rised by this expansion of intellectual
      activity. ‘All the Athenians and strangers
      which were there spent their time in nothing
      else, but either to tell or to hear some new
      thing’ is the description given in the Acts of
      the Apostles of the decline of Greek
      intellectualism.
      The Age of Intellect is accompanied by
      surprising advances in natural science. In the
      ninth century, for example, in the age of
      Mamun, the Arabs measured the circum
      ference of the earth with remarkable
      accuracy. Seven centuries were to pass
      before Western Europe discovered that the
      world was not flat. Less than fifty years after
      the amazing scientific discoveries under
      Mamun, the Arab Empire collapsed. Won
      derful and beneficent as was the progress of
      science, it did not save the empire from
      chaos.
      The full flowering of Arab and Persian
      intellectualism did not occur until after their
      imperial and political collapse. Thereafter
      the intellectuals attained fresh triumphs in
      the academic field, but politically they
      became the abject servants of the often
      illiterate rulers. When the Mongols conqu
      ered Persia in the thirteenth century, they
      were themselves entirely uneducated and
      were obliged to depend wholly on native
      Persian officials to administer the country
      and to collect the revenue. They retained as
      wazeer, or Prime Minister, one Rashid al
      Din, a historian of international repute. Yet
      12
      The Fate of Empires
      the Prime Minister, when speaking to the
      Mongol II Khan, was obliged to remain
      throughout the interview on his knees. At
      state banquets, the Prime Minister stood
      behind the Khan’s seat to wait upon him. If
      the Khan were in a good mood, he
      occasionally passed his wazeer a piece of
      food over his shoulder.
      As in the case of the Athenians,
      intellectualism leads to discussion, debate
      and argument, such as is typical of the
      Western nations today. Debates in elected
      assemblies or local committees, in articles in
      the Press or in interviews on television—
      endless and incessant talking.
      Men are interminably different, and
      intellectual arguments rarely lead to
      agreement. Thus public affairs drift from bad
      to worse, amid an unceasing cacophony of
      argument. But this constant dedication to
      discussion seems to destroy the power of
      action. Amid a Babel of talk, the ship drifts
      on to the rocks.
      XX The inadequacy of intellect
      Perhaps the most dangerous by-product of
      the Age of Intellect is the unconscious
      growth of the idea that the human brain can
      solve the problems of the world. Even on the
      low level of practical affairs this is patently
      untrue. Any small human activity, the local
      bowls club or the ladies’ luncheon club,
      requires for its survival a measure of self-
      sacrifice and service on the part of the
      members. In a wider national sphere, the
      survival of the nation depends basically on
      the loyalty and self-sacrifice of the citizens.
      The impression that the situation can be
      saved by mental cleverness, without unsel
      f
      ishness or human self-dedication, can only
      lead to collapse.
      Thus we see that the cultivation of the
      human intellect seems to be a magnificent
      ideal, but only on condition that it does not
      weaken unselfishness and human dedication
      to service. Yet this, judging by historical
      precedent, seems to be exactly what it does
      do. Perhaps it is not the intellectualism
      which destroys the spirit of self-sacrifice—the
      least we can say is that the two,
      intellectualism and the loss of a sense of
      duty, appear simultaneously in the life-story
      of the nation.
      Indeed it often appears in individuals, that
      the head and the heart are natural rivals. The
      brilliant but cynical intellectual appears at
      the opposite end of the spectrum from the
      emotional self-sacrifice of the hero or the
      martyr. Yet there are times when the perhaps
      unsophisticated self-dedication of the hero is
      more essential than the sarcasms of the
      clever.
      XXI Civil dissensions
      Another remarkable and unexpected
      symptom of national decline is the intensi
      f
      ication of internal political hatreds. One
      would have expected that, when the survival
      of the nation became precarious, political
      factions would drop their rivalry and stand
      shoulder-to-shoulder to save their country.
      In the fourteenth century, the weakening
      empire of Byzantium was threatened, and
      indeed dominated, by the Ottoman Turks.
      The situation was so serious that one would
      have expected every subject of Byzantium to
      abandon his personal interests and to stand
      with his compatriots in a last desperate
      attempt to save the country. The reverse
      occurred. The Byzantines spent the last fifty
      years of their history in fighting one another
      in repeated civil wars, until the Ottomans
      The Fate of Empires
      13
      moved in and administered the coup de
      grâce.
      Britain has been governed by an elected
      parliament for many centuries. In former
      years, however, the rival parties observed
      many unwritten laws. Neither party wished
      to eliminate the other. All the members
      referred to one another as honourable
      gentlemen. But such courtesies have now
      lapsed. Booing, shouting and loud noises
      have undermined the dignity of the House,
      and angry exchanges are more frequent. We
      are fortunate if these rivalries are fought out
      in Parliament, but sometimes such hatreds
      are carried into the streets, or into industry
      in the form of strikes, demonstrations,
      boycotts and similar activities. True to the
      normal course followed by nations in
      decline,
      internal
      differences
      are
      not
      reconciled in an attempt to save the nation.
      On the contrary, internal rivalries become
      more acute, as the nation becomes weaker.
      XXII The influx of foreigners
      One of the oft-repeated phenomena of
      great empires is the influx of foreigners to
      the capital city. Roman historians often
      complain of the number of Asians and
      Africans in Rome. Baghdad, in its prime in
      the ninth century, was international in its
      population—Persians, Turks, Arabs, Arme
      nians, Egyptians, Africans and Greeks
      mingled in its streets.
      In London today, Cypriots, Greeks,
      Italians, Russians, Africans, Germans and
      Indians jostle one another on the buses and
      in the underground, so that it sometimes
      seems difficult to find any British. The same
      applies to New York, perhaps even more so.
      This problem does not consist in any
      inferiority of one race as compared with
      another, but simply in the differences
      between them.
      In the age of the first outburst and the
      subsequent Age of Conquests, the race is
      normally
      ethnically more
      or
      less
      homogeneous. This state of affairs facilitates
      a feeling of solidarity and comradeship. But
      in the Ages of Commerce and Affluence,
      every type of foreigner floods into the great
      city, the streets of which are reputed to be
      paved with gold. As, in most cases, this great
      city is also the capital of the empire, the
      cosmopolitan crowd at the seat of empire
      exercises a political influence greatly in
      excess of its relative numbers.
      Second- or third-generation foreign
      immigrants may appear outwardly to be
      entirely assimilated, but they often constitute
      a weakness in two directions. First, their
      basic human nature often differs from that of
      the original imperial stock. If the earlier
      imperial race was stubborn and slow
      moving, the immigrants might come from
      more emotional races, thereby introducing
      cracks and schisms into the national policies,
      even if all were equally loyal.
      Second, while the nation is still affluent, all
      the diverse races may appear equally loyal.
      But in an acute emergency, the immigrants
      will often be less willing to sacrifice their
      lives and their property than will be the
      original descendants of the founder race.
      Third, the immigrants are liable to form
      communities of their own, protecting
      primarily their own interests, and only in the
      second degree that of the nation as a whole.
      Fourth, many of the foreign immigrants
      will probably belong to races originally
      conquered by and absorbed into the empire.
      While the empire is enjoying its High Noon
      of prosperity, all these people are proud and
      14
      The Fate of Empires
      glad to be imperial citizens. But when decline
      sets in, it is extraordinary how the memory
      of ancient wars, perhaps centuries before, is
      suddenly revived, and local or provincial
      movements appear demanding secession or
      independence. Some day this phenomenon
      will doubtless appear in the now apparently
      monolithic and authoritarian Soviet empire.
      It is amazing for how long such provincial
      sentiments can survive.
      Historical examples of this phenomenon
      are scarcely needed. The idle and captious
      Roman mob, with its endless appetite for
      free distributions of food—bread and
      games—is notorious, and utterly different
      from that stern Roman spirit which we
      associate with the wars of the early republic.
      In Baghdad, in the golden days of Harun
      al-Rashid, Arabs were a minority in the
      imperial capital. Istanbul, in the great days
      of Ottoman rule, was peopled by inhabitants
      remarkably few of whom were descendants
      of Turkish conquerors. In New York,
      descendants of the Pilgrim Fathers are few
      and far between.
      This interesting phenomenon is largely
      limited to great cities. The original conqu
      ering race is often to be found in relative
      purity in rural districts and on far frontiers.
      It is the wealth of the great cities which
      draws the immigrants. As, with the growth of
      industry, cities nowadays achieve an ever
      greater preponderance over the countryside,
      so will the influence of foreigners increa
      singly dominate old empires.
      Once more it may be emphasised that I do
      not wish to convey the impression that
      immigrants are inferior to older stocks. They
      are just different, and they thus tend to
      introduce cracks and divisions.
      XXIII Frivolity
      As the nation declines in power and
      wealth, a universal pessimism gradually
      pervades the people, and itself hastens the
      decline. There is nothing succeeds like
      success, and, in the Ages of Conquest and
      Commerce, the nation was carried
      triumphantly onwards on the wave of its own
      self-confidence. Republican Rome was
      repeatedly on the verge of extinction—in 390
      B.C. when the Gauls sacked the city and in
      216 B.C. after the Battle of Cannae. But no
      disasters could shake the resolution of the
      early Romans. Yet, in the later stages of
      Roman decline, the whole empire was deeply
      pessimistic, thereby sapping its own
      resolution.
      Frivolity is the frequent companion of
      pessimism. Let us eat, drink and be merry,
      for tomorrow we die. The resemblance
      between various declining nations in this
      respect is truly surprising. The Roman mob,
      we have seen, demanded free meals and
      public games. Gladiatorial shows, chariot
      races and athletic events were their passion.
      In the Byzantine Empire the rivalries of the
      Greens and the Blues in the hippodrome
      attained the importance of a major crisis.
      Judging by the time and space allotted to
      them in the Press and television, football and
      baseball are the activities which today chiefly
      interest the public in Britain and the United
      States respectively.
      The heroes of declining nations are always
      the same—the athlete, the singer or the
      actor. The word ‘celebrity’ today is used to
      designate a comedian or a football player,
      not a statesman, a general, or a literary
      genius.
      The Fate of Empires
      15
      XXIV The Arab decline
      In the first half of the ninth century,
      Baghdad enjoyed its High Noon as the
      greatest and the richest city in the world. In
      861, however, the reigning Khalif (caliph),
      Mutawakkil, was murdered by his Turkish
      mercenaries, who set up a military dictator
      ship, which lasted for some thirty years.
      During this period the empire fell apart, the
      various dominions and provinces each
      assuming virtual independence and seeking
      its own interests. Baghdad, lately the capital
      of a vast empire, found its authority limited
      to Iraq alone.
      The works of the contemporary historians
      of Baghdad in the early tenth century are still
      available.
      They
      deeply deplored the
      degeneracy of the times in which they lived,
      emphasising particularly the indifference to
      religion, the increasing materialism and the
      laxity of sexual morals. They lamented also
      the corruption of the officials of the
      government and the fact that politicians
      always seemed to amass large fortunes while
      they were in office.
      The historians commented bitterly on the
      extraordinary influence acquired by popular
      singers over young people, resulting in a
      decline in sexual morality. The ‘pop’ singers
      of Baghdad accompanied their erotic songs
      on the lute, an instrument resembling the
      modern guitar. In the second half of the
      tenth century, as a result, much obscene
      sexual language came increasingly into use,
      such as would not have been tolerated in an
      earlier age. Several khalifs issued orders
      banning ‘pop’ singers from the capital, but
      within a few years they always returned.
      An increase in the influence of women in
      public life has often been associated with na
      tional decline. The later Romans complained
      that, although Rome ruled the world, women
      ruled Rome. In the tenth century, a similar
      tendency was observable in the Arab Empire,
      the women demanding admission to the
      professions hitherto monopolised by men.
      ‘What,’ wrote the contemporary historian,
      Ibn Bessam, ‘have the professions of clerk,
      tax-collector or preacher to do with women?
      These occupations have always been limited
      to men alone.’ Many women practised law,
      while others obtained posts as university
      professors. There was an agitation for the
      appointment of female judges, which,
      however, does not appear to have succeeded.
      Soon after this period, government and
      public order collapsed, and foreign invaders
      overran the country. The resulting increase
      in confusion and violence made it unsafe for
      women to move unescorted in the streets,
      with the result that this feminist movement
      collapsed.
      The disorders following the military take
      over in 861, and the loss of the empire, had
      played havoc with the economy. At such a
      moment, it might have been expected that
      everyone would redouble their efforts to save
      the country from bankruptcy, but nothing of
      the kind occurred. Instead, at this moment of
      declining trade and financial stringency, the
      people of Baghdad introduced a five-day
      week.
      When I first read these contemporary
      descriptions of tenth-century Baghdad, I
      could scarcely believe my eyes. I told myself
      that this must be a joke! The descriptions
      might have been taken out of The Times
      today. The resemblance of all the details was
      especially breathtaking—the break-up of the
      empire, the abandonment of sexual morality,
      the ‘pop’ singers with their guitars, the entry
      of women into the professions, the five-day
      16
      The Fate of Empires
      week. I would not venture to attempt an
      explanation! There are so many mysteries
      about human life which are far beyond our
      comprehension.
      XXV Political ideology
      Today we attach immense importance to
      the ideology of our internal politics. The
      Press and public media in the U.S.A. and
      Britain pour incessant scorn on any country
      the political institutions of which differ in
      any manner from our own idea of
      democracy. It is, therefore, interesting to
      note that the life-expectation of a great
      nation does not appear to be in any way
      affected by the nature of its institutions.
      Past empires show almost every possible
      variation of political system, but all go
      through the same procedure from the Age of
      Pioneers through Conquest, Commerce,
      Affluence to decline and collapse.
      XXVI The Mameluke Empire
      The empire of the Mamelukes of Egypt
      provides a case in point, for it was one of the
      most exotic ever to be recorded in history. It
      is also exceptional in that it began on one
      f
      ixed day and ended on another, leaving no
      doubt of its precise duration, which was 267
      years.
      In the first part of the thirteenth century,
      Egypt and Syria were ruled by the Ayoubid
      sultans, the descendants of the family of
      Saladin. Their army consisted of Mamelukes,
      slaves imported as boys from the Steppes
      and trained as professional soldiers. On 1st
      May 1250, the Mamelukes mutinied,
      murdered Turan Shah, the Ayoubid sultan,
      and became the rulers of his empire.
      The first fifty years of the Mameluke
      Empire were marked by desperate fighting
      with the hitherto invincible Mongols, the
      descendants of Genghis Khan, who invaded
      Syria. By defeating the Mongols and driving
      them out of Syria, the Mamelukes saved the
      Mediterranean from the terrible fate which
      had overtaken Persia. In 1291, the Mame
      lukes captured Acre, and put an end to the
      Crusades.
      From 1309 to 1341, the Mameluke Empire
      was everywhere victorious and possessed the
      f
      inest army in the world. For the ensuing
      hundred years the wealth of the Mameluke
      Empire was fabulous, slowly leading to
      luxury, the relaxation of discipline and to
      decline, with ever more bitter internal
      political rivalries. Finally the empire collap
      sed in 1517, as the result of military defeat
      by the Ottomans.
      The Mameluke government appears to us
      utterly illogical and fantastic. The ruling
      class was entirely recruited from young boys,
      born in what is now Southern Russia. Every
      one of them was enlisted as a private soldier.
      Even the sultans had begun life as private
      soldiers and had risen from the ranks. Yet
      this extraordinary political system resulted
      in an empire which passed through all the
      normal stages of conquest, commercialism,
      affluence and decline and which lasted
      approximately the usual period of time.
      XXVII The master race
      The people of the great nations of the past
      seem normally to have imagined that their
      pre-eminence would last for ever. Rome
      appeared to its citizens to be destined to be
      for all time the mistress of the world. The
      Abbasid Khalifs of Baghdad declared that
      God had appointed them to rule mankind
      until the day of judgement. Seventy years
      ago, many people in Britain believed that the
      The Fate of Empires
      17
      empire would endure for ever. Although
      Hitler failed to achieve his objective, he
      declared that Germany would rule the world
      for a thousand years. That sentiments like
      these could be publicly expressed without
      evoking derision shows that, in all ages, the
      regular rise and fall of great nations has
      passed unperceived. The simplest statistics
      prove the steady rotation of one nation after
      another at regular intervals.
      The belief that their nation would rule the
      world forever, naturally encouraged the
      citizens of the leading nation of any period to
      attribute their pre-eminence to hereditary
      virtues. They carried in their blood, they
      believed, qualities which constituted them a
      race of supermen, an illusion which inclined
      them to the employment of cheap foreign
      labour (or slaves) to perform menial tasks
      and to engage foreign mercenaries to fight
      their battles or to sail their ships.
      These poorer peoples were only too happy
      to migrate to the wealthy cities of the empire,
      and thereby, as we have seen, to adulterate
      the close-knit, homogeneous character of the
      conquering race. The latter unconsciously
      assumed that they would always be the
      leaders of mankind, relaxed their energies,
      and spent an increasing part of their time in
      leisure, amusement or sport.
      In recent years, the idea has spread widely
      in the West that ‘progress’ will be automatic
      without effort, that everyone will continue to
      grow richer and richer and that every year
      will show a ‘rise in the standard of living’. We
      have not drawn from history the obvious
      conclusion that material success is the result
      of courage, endurance and hard work—a
      conclusion nevertheless obvious from the
      history of the meteoric rise of our own
      ancestors. This self-assurance of its own
      superiority seems to go hand-in-hand with
      the luxury resulting from wealth, in
      undermining the character of the dominant
      race.
      XXVIII The welfare state
      When the welfare state was first introduced
      in Britain, it was hailed as a new high-water
      mark in the history of human development.
      History, however, seems to suggest that the
      age of decline of a great nation is often a
      period which shows a tendency to
      philanthropy and to sympathy for other
      races. This phase may not be contradictory
      to the feeling described in the previous
      paragraph, that the dominant race has the
      right to rule the world. For the citizens of the
      great nation enjoy the role of Lady Bountiful.
      As long as it retains its status of leadership,
      the imperial people are glad to be generous,
      even if slightly condescending. The rights of
      citizenship are generously bestowed on every
      race, even those formerly subject, and the
      equality of mankind is proclaimed. The
      Roman Empire passed through this phase,
      when equal citizenship was thrown open to
      all peoples, such provincials even becoming
      senators and emperors.
      The Arab Empire of Baghdad was equally,
      perhaps even more, generous. During the
      Age of Conquests, pure-bred Arabs had
      constituted a ruling class, but in the ninth
      century the empire was completely
      cosmopolitan.
      State assistance to the young and the poor
      was equally generous. University students
      received government grants to cover their
      expenses while they were receiving higher
      education. The State likewise offered free
      medical treatment to the poor. The first free
      public hospital was opened in Baghdad in
      18
      The Fate of Empires
      the reign of Harun al-Rashid (786-809), and
      under his son, Mamun, free public hospitals
      sprang up all over the Arab world from Spain
      to what is now Pakistan.
      The impression that it will always be
      automatically rich causes the declining
      empire to spend lavishly on its own
      benevolence, until such time as the economy
      collapses, the universities are closed and the
      hospitals fall into ruin.
      It may perhaps be incorrect to picture the
      welfare state as the high-water mark of
      human attainment. It may merely prove to
      be one more regular milestone in the life
      story of an ageing and decrepit empire.
      XXIX Religion
      Historians of periods of decadence often
      refer to a decline in religion, but, if we
      extend our investigation over a period
      covering the Assyrians (859-612 B.C.) to our
      own times, we have to interpret religion in a
      very broad sense. Some such definition as
      ‘the human feeling that there is something,
      some invisible Power, apart from material
      objects, which controls human life and the
      natural world’.
      We are probably too narrow and
      contemptuous in our interpretation of idol
      worship. The people of ancient civilisations
      were as sensible as we are, and would
      scarcely have been so foolish as to worship
      sticks and stones fashioned by their own
      hands. The idol was for them merely a
      symbol, and represented an unknown,
      spiritual reality, which controlled the lives of
      men and demanded human obedience to its
      moral precepts.
      We all know only too well that minor
      differences in the human visualisation of this
      Spirit frequently became the ostensible
      reason for human wars, in which both sides
      claimed to be fighting for the true God, but
      the
      absurd
      narrowness
      of
      human
      conceptions should not blind us to the fact
      that, very often, both sides believed their
      campaigns to have a moral background.
      Genghis Khan, one of the most brutal of all
      conquerors, claimed that God had delegated
      him the duty to exterminate the decadent
      races of the civilised world. Thus the Age of
      Conquests often had some kind of religious
      atmosphere, which implied heroic self
      sacrifice for the cause.
      But this spirit of dedication was slowly
      eroded in the Age of Commerce by the action
      of money. People make money for
      themselves, not for their country. Thus
      periods of affluence gradually dissolved the
      spirit of service, which had caused the rise of
      the imperial races.
      In due course, selfishness permeated the
      community, the coherence of which was
      weakened until
      disintegration
      was
      threatened. Then, as we have seen, came the
      period of pessimism with the accompanying
      spirit of frivolity and sensual indulgence, by
      products of despair. It was inevitable at such
      times that men should look back yearningly
      to the days of ‘religion’, when the spirit of
      self-sacrifice was still strong enough to make
      men ready to give and to serve, rather than
      to snatch.
      But while despair might permeate the
      greater part of the nation, others achieved a
      new realisation of the fact that only readi
      ness for self-sacrifice could enable a commu
      nity to survive. Some of the greatest saints in
      history lived in times of national decadence,
      raising the banner of duty and service
      against the flood of depravity and despair.
      The Fate of Empires
      19
      In this manner, at the height of vice and
      frivolity the seeds of religious revival are
      quietly sown. After, perhaps, several
      generations (or even centuries) of suffering,
      the impoverished nation has been purged of
      its selfishness and its love of money, religion
      regains its sway and a new era sets in. ‘It is
      good for me that I have been afflicted,’ said
      the psalmist, ‘that I might learn Thy
      Statutes.’
      XXX New combinations
      We have traced the rise of an obscure race
      to fame, through the stages of conquest,
      commercialism, affluence, and intellectu
      alism, to disintegration, decadence and
      despair. We suggested that the dominant
      race at any given time imparts its leading
      characteristics to the world around, being in
      due course succeeded by another empire. By
      this means, we speculated, many successive
      races succeeded one another as super
      powers, and in turn bequeathed their
      peculiar qualities to mankind at large.
      But the objection may here be raised that
      some day the time will come when all the
      races of the world will in turn have enjoyed
      their period of domination and have
      collapsed again in decadence. When the
      whole human race has reached the stage of
      decadence, where will new energetic con
      quering races be found?
      The answer is at first partially obscured by
      our modern habit of dividing the human race
      into nations, which we seem to regard as
      water-tight compartments, an error respon
      sible for innumerable misunderstandings.
      In earlier times, warlike nomadic nations
      invaded the territories of decadent peoples
      and settled there. In due course, they
      intermarried with the local population and a
      new race resulted, though it sometimes
      retained an old name. The barbarian
      invasions of the Roman Empire probably
      provide the example best known today in the
      West. Others were the Arab conquests of
      Spain, North Africa and Persia, the Turkish
      conquests of the Ottoman Empire, or even
      the Norman Conquest of England.
      In all such cases, the conquered countries
      were originally fully inhabited and the inva
      ders were armies, which ultimately settled
      down and married, and produced new races.
      In our times, there are few nomadic
      conquerors left in the world, who could
      invade more settled countries bringing their
      tents and flocks with them. But ease of travel
      has resulted in an equal, or probably an even
      greater, intermixture of populations. The
      extreme bitterness of modern internal poli
      tical struggles produces a constant flow of
      migrants from their native countries to
      others, where the social institutions suit
      them better.
      The vicissitudes of trade and business
      similarly result in many persons moving to
      other countries, at first intending to return,
      but ultimately settling down in their new
      countries.
      The population of Britain has been
      constantly changing, particularly in the last
      sixty years, owing to the influx of immigrants
      from Europe, Asia and Africa, and the exit of
      British citizens to the Dominions and the
      United States. The latter is, of course, the
      most obvious example of the constant rise of
      new nations, and of the transformation of
      the ethnic content of old nations through this
      modern nomadism.
      20
      The Fate of Empires
      XXXI Decadence of a system
      It is of interest to note that decadence is
      the disintegration of a system, not of its
      individual members. The habits of the
      members of the community have been
      corrupted by the enjoyment of too much
      money and too much power for too long a
      period. The result has been, in the
      framework of their national life, to make
      them selfish and idle. A community of selfish
      and idle people declines, internal quarrels
      develop in the division of its dwindling
      wealth, and pessimism follows, which some
      of them endeavour to drown in sensuality or
      frivolity. In their own surroundings, they are
      unable to redirect their thoughts and their
      energies into new channels.
      But when individual members of such a
      society emigrate into entirely new surroun
      dings, they do not remain conspicuously
      decadent, pessimistic or immoral among the
      inhabitants of their new homeland. Once
      enabled to break away from their old
      channels of thought, and after a short period
      of readjustment, they become normal
      citizens of their adopted countries. Some of
      them, in the second and third generations,
      may attain pre-eminence and leadership in
      their new communities.
      This seems to prove that the decline of any
      nation does not undermine the energies or
      the basic character of its members. Nor does
      the decadence of a number of such nations
      permanently impoverish the human race.
      Decadence is both mental and moral
      deterioration, produced by the slow decline
      of the community from which its members
      cannot escape, as long as they remain in
      their old surroundings. But, transported
      elsewhere, they soon discard their decadent
      ways of thought, and prove themselves equal
      to the other citizens of their adopted country.
      XXXII Decadence is not physical
      Neither is decadence physical. The citizens
      of nations in decline are sometimes
      described as too physically emasculated to be
      able to bear hardship or make great efforts.
      This does not seem to be a true picture.
      Citizens of great nations in decadence are
      normally physically larger and stronger than
      those of their barbarian invaders.
      Moreover, as was proved in Britain in the
      f
      irst World War, young men brought up in
      luxury and wealth found little difficulty in
      accustoming themselves to life in the front
      line trenches. The history of exploration
      proves the same point. Men accustomed to
      comfortable living in homes in Europe or
      America were able to show as much
      endurance as the natives in riding camels
      across the desert or in hacking their way
      through tropical forests.
      Decadence is a moral and spiritual disease,
      resulting from too long a period of wealth
      and power, producing cynicism, decline of
      religion, pessimism and frivolity. The
      citizens of such a nation will no longer make
      an effort to save themselves, because they
      are not convinced that anything in life is
      worth saving.
      XXXII Human diversity
      Generalisations are always dangerous.
      Human beings are all different. The variety
      in human life is endless. If this be the case
      with individuals, it is much more so with
      nations and cultures. No two societies, no
      two peoples, no two cultures are exactly the
      same. In these circumstances, it will be easy
      The Fate of Empires
      21
      for critics to find many objections to what
      has been said, and to point out exceptions to
      the generalisations.
      There is some value in comparing the lives
      of nations to those of individuals. No two
      persons in the world are identical. Moreover
      their lives are often affected by accidents or
      by illness, making the divergences even more
      obvious. Yet, in fact, we can generalise about
      human life from many different aspects. The
      characteristics of childhood, adolescence,
      youth, middle and old age are well known.
      Some adolescents, it is true, are prematurely
      wise and serious. Some persons in middle
      age still seem to he young. But such
      exceptions do not invalidate the general
      character of human life from the cradle to
      the grave.
      I venture to submit that the lives of nations
      follow a similar pattern. Superficially, all
      seem to be completely different. Some years
      ago, a suggestion was submitted to a certain
      television corporation that a series of talks
      on Arab history would form an interesting
      sequence. The proposal was immediately
      vetoed by the director of programmes with
      the remark, “What earthly interest could the
      history of medieval Arabs have for the
      general public today?”
      Yet, in fact, the history of the Arab imperial
      age—from conquest through commercialism,
      to affluence, intellectualism, science and
      decadence—is an exact precursor of British
      imperial history and lasted almost exactly
      the same time.
      If British historians, a century ago, had
      devoted serious study to the Arab Empire,
      they could have foreseen almost everything
      that has happened in Britain down to 1976.
      XXXIV A variety of falls
      It has been shown that, normally, the rise
      and fall of great nations are due to internal
      reasons alone. Ten generations of human
      beings suffice to transform the hardy and
      enterprising pioneer into the captious citizen
      of the welfare state. But whereas the life
      histories of great nations show an unex
      pected uniformity, the nature of their falls
      depends largely on outside circumstances
      and thus shows a high degree of diversity.
      The Roman Republic, as we have seen, was
      followed by the empire, which became a
      super-state, in which all the natives of the
      Mediterranean basin, regardless of race,
      possessed equal rights. The name of Rome,
      originally a city-state, passed from it to an
      equalitarian international empire.
      This empire broke in half, the western half
      being overrun by northern barbarians, the
      eastern half forming the East Roman or
      Byzantine Empire.
      The vast Arab Empire broke up in the
      ninth century into many fragments, of which
      one former colony, Moslem Spain, ran its
      own 250-year course as an independent
      empire. The homelands of Syria and Iraq,
      however, were conquered by successive
      waves of Turks to whom they remained
      subject for 1,000 years.
      The Mameluke Empire of Egypt and Syria,
      on the other hand, was conquered in one
      campaign by the Ottomans, the native
      population merely suffering a change of
      masters.
      The Spanish Empire (1500-1750) endured
      for the conventional 250 years, terminated
      only by the loss of its colonies. The homeland
      of Spain fell, indeed, from its high estate of a
      22
      The Fate of Empires
      super-power, but remained as an indepen
      dent nation until today.
      Romanov Russia (1682-1916) ran the
      normal course, but was succeeded by the
      Soviet Union.
      It is unnecessary to labour the point, which
      we may attempt to summarise briefly. Any
      regime which attains great wealth and power
      seems with remarkable regularity to decay
      and fall apart in some ten generations. The
      ultimate fate of its component parts,
      however, does not depend on its internal
      nature, but on the other organisations which
      appear at the time of its collapse and succeed
      in devouring its heritage. Thus the lives of
      great powers are surprisingly uniform, but
      the results of their falls are completely
      diverse.
      XXXV Inadequacy of our historical
      studies
      In fact, the modern nations of the West
      have derived only limited value from their
      historical studies, because they have never
      made them big enough. For history to have
      meaning, as we have already stated, it must
      be the history of the human race.
      Far from achieving such an ideal, our
      historical studies are largely limited to the
      history of our own country during the
      lifetime of the present nation. Thus the time
      factor is too short to allow the longer
      rhythms of the rise and fall of nations even to
      be noticed. As the television director
      indicated, it never even crosses our minds
      that longer periods could be of any interest.
      When we read the history of our own
      nation, we find the actions of our ancestors
      described as glorious, while those of other
      peoples are depicted as mean, tyrannical or
      cowardly. Thus our history is (intentionally)
      not based on facts. We are emotionally
      unwilling to accept that our forbears might
      have been mean or cowardly.
      Alternatively, there are ‘political’ schools of
      history, slanted to discredit the actions of
      our past leaders, in order to support modern
      political movements. In all these cases,
      history is not an attempt to ascertain the
      truth, but a system of propaganda, devoted
      to the furtherance of modern projects, or the
      gratification of national vanity.
      Men can scarcely be blamed for not
      learning from the history they are taught.
      There is nothing to learn from it, because it
      is not true.
      XXXVI Small nations
      The word ‘empires’ has been used in this
      essay to signify nations which achieve the
      status of great powers, or super-powers, in
      the jargon of today—nations which have
      dominated the international scene for two or
      three centuries. At any given time, however,
      there are also smaller states which are more
      or less self-contained. Do these live the same
      ‘lives’ as the great nations, and pass through
      the same phases?
      It seems impossible to generalise on this
      issue. In general, decadence is the outcome
      of too long a period of wealth and power. If
      the small country has not shared in the
      wealth and power, it will not share in the
      decadence.
      XXXVII The emerging pattern
      In spite of the endless variety and the
      infinite complications of human life, a
      general pattern does seem to emerge from
      these considerations. It reveals many
      successive empires covering some 3,000
      years, as having followed similar stages of
      The Fate of Empires
      23
      development and decline, and as having, to a
      surprising degree, ‘lived’ lives of very similar
      length.
      The life-expectation of a great nation, it
      appears, commences with a violent, and
      usually unforeseen, outburst of energy, and
      ends in a lowering of moral standards,
      cynicism, pessimism and frivolity.
      If the present writer were a millionaire, he
      would try to establish in some university or
      other a department dedicated solely to the
      study of the rhythm of the rise and fall of
      powerful nations throughout the world.
      History goes back only some 3,000 years,
      because before that period writing was not
      sufficiently widespread to allow of the
      survival of detailed records. But within that
      period, the number of empires available for
      study is very great.
      At the commencement of this essay, the
      names of eleven such empires were listed,
      but these included only the Middle East and
      the modern nations of the West. India, China
      and Southern America were not included,
      because the writer knows nothing about
      them. A school founded to study the rise and
      fall of empires would probably find at least
      twenty-four great powers available for
      dissection and analysis.
      The task would not be an easy one, if
      indeed the net were cast so wide as to cover
      virtually all the world’s great nations in 3,000
      years. The knowledge of language alone, to
      enable detailed investigations to be pursued,
      would present a formidable obstacle.
      XXXVIII Would it help?
      It is pleasing to imagine that, from such
      studies, a regular life-pattern of nations
      would emerge, including an analysis of the
      various changes which ultimately lead to
      decline, decadence and collapse. It is
      tempting to assume that measures could be
      adopted to forestall the disastrous effects of
      excessive wealth and power, and thence of
      subsequent decadence. Perhaps some means
      could be devised to prevent the activist Age
      of Conquests and Commerce deteriorating
      into the Age of Intellect, producing endless
      talking but no action.
      It is tempting to think so. Perhaps if the
      pattern of the rise and fall of nations were
      regularly taught in schools, the general
      public would come to realise the truth, and
      would support policies to maintain the spirit
      of duty and self-sacrifice, and to forestall the
      accumulation of excessive wealth by one
      nation, leading to the demoralisation of that
      nation.
      Could not the sense of duty and the
      initiative needed to give rise to action be
      retained parallel with intellectual develop
      ment and the discoveries of natural science?
      The answer is doubtful, though we could
      but try. The weaknesses of human nature,
      however, are so obvious, that we cannot be
      too confident of success. Men bursting with
      courage, energy and self-confidence cannot
      easily be restrained from subduing their
      neighbours, and men who see the prospect of
      wealth open to them will not readily be
      prevented from pursuing it.
      Perhaps it is not in the real interest of
      humanity that they should be so prevented,
      for it is in periods of wealth that art,
      architecture, music, science and literature
      make the greatest progress.
      Moreover, as we have seen where great
      empires are concerned, their establishment
      may give rise to wars and tragedies, but their
      periods of power often bring peace, security
      and prosperity to vast areas of territory. Our
      24
      The Fate of Empires
      knowledge and our experience (perhaps our
      basic human intellects) are inadequate to
      pronounce whether or not the rise and fall of
      great nations is the best system for the best
      of all possible worlds.
      These doubts, however, need not prevent
      us from attempting to acquire more
      knowledge on the rise and fall of great
      powers, or from endeavouring, in the light of
      such knowledge, to improve the moral
      quality of human life.
      Perhaps, in fact, we may reach the
      conclusion that the successive rise and fall of
      great nations is inevitable and, indeed, a
      system divinely ordained. But even this
      would be an immense gain. For we should
      know where we stand in relation to our
      human brothers and sisters. In our present
      state of mental chaos on the subject, we
      divide ourselves into nations, parties or
      communities and fight, hate and vilify one
      another over developments which may
      perhaps be divinely ordained and which
      seem to us, if we take a broader view,
      completely uncontrollable and inevitable. If
      we could accept these great movements as
      beyond our control, there would be no
      excuse for our hating one another because of
      them.
      However varied, confusing and contra
      dictory the religious history of the world may
      appear, the noblest and most spiritual of the
      devotees of all religions seem to reach the
      conclusion that love is the key to human life.
      Any expansion of our knowledge which may
      lead to a reduction in our unjustified hates is
      therefore surely well worth while.
      XXXIX Summary
      As numerous points of interest have arisen
      in the course of this essay, I close with a brief
      summary, to refresh the reader’s mind.
      (a) We do not learn from history because
      our studies are brief and prejudiced.
      (b) In a surprising manner, 250 years
      emerges as the average length of national
      greatness.
      (c) This average has not varied for 3,000
      years. Does it represent ten generations?
      (d) The stages of the rise and fall of great
      nations seem to be:
      The Age of Pioneers (outburst)
      The Age of Conquests
      The Age of Commerce
      The Age of Affluence
      The Age of Intellect
      The Age of Decadence.
      (e) Decadence is marked by:
      Defensiveness
      Pessimism
      Materialism
      Frivolity
      An influx of foreigners
      The Welfare State
      A weakening of religion.
      (f) Decadence is due to:
      Too long a period of wealth and power
      Selfishness
      Love of money
      The loss of a sense of duty.
      (g) The life histories of great states are
      amazingly similar, and are due to internal
      factors.
      (h) Their falls are diverse, because they are
      largely the result of external causes.
      (i) History should be taught as the history
      of the human race, though of course with
      emphasis on the history of the student’s own
      country.